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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
 
STATE OF IDAHO,   ) 
     ) NO. 43999 
 Plaintiff-Respondent, )  
     ) CANYON COUNTY NO. CR 2015-22359 
v.     ) 
     ) 
BRUCE WAYNE COSTA,  ) APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
     ) 
 Defendant-Appellant. ) 
___________________________) 
 
 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
 
Nature of the Case 
 
 Bruce Costa appeals, asserting the district court abused its discretion when it 
imposed his sentence for aggravated battery in this case.  Specifically, he contends the 
district court did not sufficiently consider the mitigating factors in this case, which reveal 
a more lenient sentence better serves all the goals of sentencing.  As a result, this Court 
should reduce Mr. Costa’s sentence as it deems appropriate, or, alternatively, remand 
this case for a new sentencing determination. 
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Statement of the Facts & Course of Proceedings 
 Mr. Costa, his girlfriend, and his brother-in-law, Noe Garcia, spent an evening 
playing pool and drinking at a bar.  (See, e.g., Presentence Investigation Report 
(hereinafter, PSI), pp.3-4 (recounting the girlfriend’s statements to police); PSI, p.4 
(recounting Mr. Garcia’s statements to police); PSI, p.5 (recounting Mr. Costa’s version 
of events).)  It was not an enjoyable night, as Mr. Garcia got into an argument with 
another patron at the bar, Mr. Costa and his girlfriend got into an argument, Mr. Costa 
and Mr. Garcia got into an argument, and someone tried to pull Mr. Costa’s girlfriend 
into his car as she was walking back to the trailer they all shared.  (See PSI, pp.3-5.)   
 Emotions continued to run high after they all got back to the trailer.  Mr. Costa 
wanted to go look for the man who had assaulted his girlfriend.  (PSI, pp.3-4.)  
Mr. Garcia’s wife joined them and argued with either Mr. Costa’s girlfriend and/or 
Mr. Garcia.  (PSI, pp.3-5.)  Mr. Costa recalled seeing Mr. Garcia hit his wife, and 
Mr. Costa tried to separate them.  (PSI, p.4.)  Mr. Garcia pushed Mr. Costa to the 
ground and they began to fight until the two women pulled them apart.  (PSI, pp.3-4.)  
Apparently, after that fight, Mr. Garcia’s son joined them, and Mr. Garcia picked him up 
and held him.  (See, e.g., PSI, p.4.)  According to Mr. Costa, his sister (Mr. Garcia’s 
wife), then told Mr. Costa that Mr. Garcia would not let her or the children leave.  (PSI, 
pp.4, 30.)  Mr. Costa told officers that, as a result, he “did what he thought he had to do” 
and struck at Mr. Garcia with a box cutter, causing a large wound in Mr. Garcia’s neck.  
(PSI, pp.3-5.)  Mr. Costa said he was scared and fled the scene.  (PSI, pp.4-6.)   
When officers found Mr. Costa a few days later, he complied with their requests 
and made a statement about his actions.  (PSI, pp.4, 30, 32.)  The officers noted that 
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Mr. Costa was sporting injuries from the fight with Mr. Garcia.  (PSI, pp.4, 31.)  From the 
outset, Mr. Costa was honest with officers.  (Tr., p.26, Ls.23-25.)  He also consistently 
expressed his remorse and accepted responsibility for his conduct.  (See, e.g., PSI, 
pp.6, Tr., p.27, Ls.3-5, p.29, Ls.21-25.)  He added he was willing to pay restitution to 
Mr. Garcia.  (Tr., p.28, Ls.4-5; PSI, p.14.)   
Mr. Costa agreed to plead guilty to one count of aggravated battery, and in 
exchange, the State agreed to dismiss several related offenses, as well as two alleged 
sentencing enhancements.  (Tr., p.5, L.15 - p.6, L.3.)  However, sentencing 
recommendations were left open.  (Tr., p.5, Ls.18-19.)  The State ultimately argued for a 
unified sentence of fifteen years, with five years fixed.  (Tr., p.25, Ls.9-15.)  Defense 
counsel urged the district court to leave open the possibility for rehabilitation, and so, 
not impose such an extensive term of “straight prison.”  (Tr., p.28, L.11 - p.29, L.4.)  The 
district court ultimately imposed a unified sentence of twelve years, with five years fixed, 
emphasizing the goals of protection of society, general deterrence, and punishment.  
(Tr., p.32, L.11 - p.33, L.2.)  It did note that, as Mr. Costa was only twenty-five years old, 
he would have the opportunity to rehabilitate as well.  (Tr., p.32, Ls.16-19.)  Mr. Costa 
filed a notice of appeal timely from the judgment of conviction.  (R., pp.69, 71.) 
 
ISSUE 
Whether the district court abused its discretion when it imposed Mr. Costa’s sentence. 
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ARGUMENT 
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Imposed Mr. Costa’s Sentence 
  
Where a defendant contends that the sentencing court imposed an excessively 
harsh sentence the appellate court will conduct an independent review of the record, 
giving consideration to the nature of the offense, the character of the offender, and the 
protection of the public interest.  See State v. Reinke, 103 Idaho 771, 772 (Ct. App. 
1982).  In order to show an abuse of the district court’s discretion in that regard, the 
defendant must show that, in light of the governing criteria, the sentence is excessive 
considering any view of the facts.  State v. Jackson, 130 Idaho 293, 294 (1997).   
The governing criteria, or sentencing objectives, are:  (1) protection of society; 
(2) deterrence of the individual and the public generally; (3) the possibility of 
rehabilitation; and (4) punishment or retribution for wrongdoing.  Id.  The protection of 
society is the primary objective the court should consider.  State v. Charboneau, 124 
Idaho 497, 500 (1993).  Therefore, a sentence that protects society and also 
accomplishes the other objectives will be considered reasonable.  Id.; State v. Toohill, 
103 Idaho 565, 568 (Ct. App. 1982).  This is because the protection of society is 
influenced by each of the other objectives, and as a result, each must be addressed in 
sentencing.  Charboneau, 124 Idaho at 500; I.C. § 19-2521.  However, the Idaho 
Supreme Court has also held that rehabilitation “should usually be the initial 
consideration in the imposition of the criminal sanction.”  State v. McCoy, 94 Idaho 236, 
240 (1971), superseded on other grounds as stated in State v. Theil, 158 Idaho 103 
(2015). 
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In this case, a sufficient consideration of the mitigating facts in the record 
demonstrates a more lenient sentence will better achieve all the goals of sentencing, 
whereas the sentence imposed by the district court fails to adequately address the 
potential for rehabilitation.  Notably, Mr. Costa was only twenty-five at the time of this 
incident.  (See PSI, p.1; Tr., p.20, Ls.12-20.)  When a defendant is still young, his age is 
a factor which weighs in mitigation because it speaks significantly to this rehabilitative 
potential.  See, e.g., State v. Shideler, 103 Idaho 593, 595 (1982); Cook v. State, 145 
Idaho 482, 489-90 (Ct. App. 2008).  Such a defendant is still maturing and still able to 
become a productive member of society. See, e.g., State v. Dunnagan, 101 Idaho 125, 
126 (1980).   
The record reflects that Mr. Costa has that rehabilitative potential.  The mental 
health examiner noted his motivation to change.  (PSI, p.50.)  Additionally, from the 
outset, he expressed remorse for his conduct.  (Tr., p.27, L.25 - p.28, L.1; Tr., p.29, 
Ls.21-25; PSI, p.6.)  He also accepted responsibility, as demonstrated by his expressed 
desire to pay restitution.  (Tr., p.28, Ls.4-5; PSI, p.14.)  Willingness to pay restitution is a 
factor that the district court is to consider in mitigation.  I.C. § 19-2521(2)(f).  This is 
because acknowledgment of guilt and acceptance of responsibility by the defendant 
are critical first steps toward rehabilitation.  See State v. Kellis, 148 Idaho 812, 815 
(Ct. App. 2010).  Furthermore, the PSI author noted that, apart from a few verbal 
warnings, Mr. Costa had not been a disciplinary problem while in prison after being 
arrested in this case.  (PSI, p.7.)  That bears out defense counsel’s statements at the 
sentencing hearing (Tr., p.26, Ls.17-21):  that Mr. Costa is not an inherently violent 
person, that his actions in this case represented a departure from his overall character.  
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See also Sivak v. State, 1112 Idaho 197, 201-02 (1986) (quoting Skipper v. South 
Carolina, 476 U.S. 1, 7 (1986)) (“The [United States Supreme Court has] emphasized 
that ‘a defendant's disposition to make a well-behaved and peaceful adjustment to life in 
prison is itself an aspect of his character that is by its nature relevant to the sentencing 
determination.’”) 
The presentence evaluations recognized this potential for rehabilitation, and so, 
recommended counseling and intensive outpatient treatment to address Mr. Costa’s 
underlying issues, such as his alcohol dependence.  (PSI, pp.47-50.)  That is an 
important factor to consider in terms of Mr. Costa’s potential for rehabilitation, and thus, 
reduction of the long-term risk to society, since, as Mr. Costa admitted to the officers 
(see R., pp.6-7), his drinking contributed to his actions in this case.  See State v. 
Osborn, 102 Idaho 405, 414 n.5 (1981) (recognizing that, while it does not constitute a 
defense to the crime, the ingestion of alcohol should be considered as a mitigating 
factor at sentencing). 
Thus, the district court abused its discretion by imposing a sentence with an 
extensive fixed term.  (See also Tr., p.32, ls.16-19 (noting only that Mr. Costa would 
have an opportunity to rehabilitate because of his age).)  That sentence effectively 
postponed Mr. Costa’s timely access to rehabilitative programming.  See, e.g., State v. 
Nice, 103 Idaho 89, 91 (1982); Cook, 145 Idaho at 489-90.  As a result, the sentence as 
imposed does not adequately serve all the goals of sentencing, and therefore, should 
be reduced, or the case should be remanded for resentencing. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
Mr. Costa respectfully requests that this Court reduce his sentence as it deems 
appropriate.  Alternatively, he requests that his case be remanded to the district court 
for a new sentencing hearing. 
 DATED this 22nd day of July, 2016. 
      _________/s/________________ 
      BRIAN R. DICKSON 
      Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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